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University Ombuds:  Issues for Fair and Equitable Complaints Resolution 
 
Michael Barnes 
Rachael Field1
 
Synopsis:  Increasingly universities around Australia are appointing university 
ombuds to assist in the resolution of student complaints against academics.  This 
paper explores a number of key issues relevant to the dispute resolution practice 
of university ombuds, particularly in relation to ensuring fair and equitable 
process and outcomes.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Effective complaints resolution between students and academics is a challenge 
for universities.  The contemporary context for this challenge in tertiary education 
is one where deregulation has increased the potential for maladministration and 
created a need for mechanisms to protect students.  A growing focus in 
universities on quality assurance and competitive performance has also required 
the development of grievance and complaint handling processes for students that 
are appropriate and just.2
 
Some universities in Australia are responding to the challenge by appointing 
senior academics to the office of university ombud.  Currently, 5 of Australia’s 38 
universities have an office of ombud,3 while others have an equivalent or similar 
                                                 
1   M. Barnes, BA/LLB(UQ), LLM(UQ), Solicitor (Qld), Head of School, School of Justice Studies, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology.  R. Field, BA/LLB(Hons)(ANU) LLM(Hons)(QUT) Barrister and Solicitor (ACT) Solicitor (Qld), lecturer, 
School of Justice Studies, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology.  Thanks to Dr Ian Wells, Dr BL Field and Prof TW 
Field for comments on earlier drafts. 
2   A Stuhmcke, (2001) “Grievance Handling in Australian Universities: the case of the university ombudsman and the dean of 
students” 23(2) Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 181at 188. 
3    These are Central Queensland University (established in 2000 at its Melbourne campus and throughout the university in 2001), 
La Trobe University (established in 1993), Queensland University of Technology (established in 1999), University of Technology, 
Sydney (established in 1989), and the first Australian university to have such an office – the University of New England (established 
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office known as the Dean of Students.4  The fact that “the nature and form of the 
‘professional’ grievance handler is far from uniform”5 in Australian universities 
has been noted as a difficulty with the growth and development of the ombud’s 
office.  Overall, however, the efficacy of the office is supported by the fact that in 
the United States university ombuds are now a feature of most university 
campuses.6
 
The concept of “ombudsman” or “ombud” is itself not easy to define as 
“increasingly, since the 1960s, the office has proliferated in numbers, diversified 
in categories and types and mutated its functions and purposes.”7  Classical 
notions of the office of ombudsman originated in Sweden in 1809 and aimed to 
provide citizens with protection from government maladministration through 
grievance procedures that were neither strictly legal nor political.8   However, as 
long ago as 200 BC the Romans had officers whose role was to protect the rights 
and interests of the citizenry and deal with their complaints.9
 
A university ombud can generally be defined as “an independent officer of the 
university who receives and investigates complaints from students about 
administrative injustices or maladministration.”10  They are “a confidential and 
informal information resource, communications channel, complaint-handler and 
dispute-resolver, and a person who helps (the university) work for change.”11  As 
a member of academic staff who is also concerned with issues of justice for 
students, a university ombud is not allied to a particular segment of the university 
                                                                                                                                                 
in 1977).  Note also that the University of Sydney had such an office but it was disbanded in 1993.  Also the University of 
Tasmania’s office was disbanded in 1992. 
4   See Stuhmke (2001) at 185 for a table of Australian Universities and the various ombudsman-like roles that exist.  18 of the 38 
Australian Universities have a position of ombudsman, dean of students or similar role.  
5   Stuhmke (2001) at 181. 
6   Stuhmke (2001) at 183.  Rowe asserts that there are “several hundred organizational ombudspeople working in academic 
institutions in the United States and Canada”: M Rowe, (1995) “Options, functions and skills: what an organizational ombudsman 
might want to know” 11(2) Negotiation Journal 103-114 at note 2.  
7   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182 referring to R Gregory, (1997) “The ombudsman observed” International Ombudsman Yearbook.  The 
Hague at 77-101.  
8   Dickson J in Re British Columbia Development Corp and Friedman (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 129 at 137. 
9   Dickson J in Re British Columbia Development Corp and Friedman (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 129 at 137. 
10   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182. 
11   Rowe (1995) at 103. 
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but rather owes allegiance to the university community as a whole.12  Further, the 
existence of an ombuds office in a university can be said to evidence a 
commitment on the part of the institution to principles of good administration.13  
From a purely strategic perspective, it also provides a university with greater 
control in how it manages grievances between students and academics.14   
 
University ombudsmanry is, however, “a profession in evolution”,15 and important 
aspects of professional practice remain uncertain and ill-defined.  For example, 
the University and College Ombudsman Association’s guidelines assert that the 
three key requirements of an ombudsman are independence, neutrality and 
confidentiality,16 however, there is much diversity within the profession as to how 
these principles operate in practice.17
 
This article considers key factors relating to the effective resolution of complaints 
by university ombuds in an attempt to address and clarify some of these 
important issues.  Part 1 of the article considers the role of a university ombud, 
particularly in relation to the informal resolution of complaints by students against 
academic staff.  Part 2 considers practical issues arising in relation to a university 
ombud’s dispute resolution practice, for example voluntary participation, power, 
neutrality and confidentiality.  This analysis focuses on concerns with the fair and 
equitable resolution of complaints by ombuds, and includes suggestions for 
enhancing university ombuds’ dispute resolution practice. 
 
Part 1 -  University Ombuds:  Their Dispute Resolution Role. 
 
                                                 
12   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182. 
13   For example, in terms of universities in Queensland, the 5 principles of good administration provided in the Public Sector Ethics 
Act (Qld) apply.   These principles are:  respect for the law and system of government, respect for persons, integrity, diligence and 
economy and efficiency. 
14   See also D Bevan (2002) “Address to Student Ombudsmen Conference”, Paper presented at the 3rd Australasian Conference of 
Ombuds and Deans of Students in Higher Education, QUT Brisbane, 14 February 2002 at 2 available at 
www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman.html at 9. 
15   Rowe (1995) at 106. 
16  R Wolff (2001) QUT University Ombudsman Annual Report 2000 at 4 available at www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman.html. 
17   See Rowe (1995) at 104.  
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A university ombud in the context of a university usually has two basic functions.  
The first is to assist in the resolution of individual complaints, and the second is 
to contribute to the improvement of administration and teaching within the 
university.18  This article is focused on the former role. 
 
The role of the university ombud in terms of informal complaints resolution 
complements rather than replaces the formal mechanisms that exist for the 
resolution of student complaints.19  These formal systems include policy-based 
internal mechanisms and formal administrative hearings such as disciplinary 
committees.20  External avenues also exist to resolve complaints in the form of, 
for example, government ombudsmen and the court system.21  However, as 
Fleming has noted “the vast majority of administrative decisions [related to 
grievances] in universities are made without resort to a formal process.”22  
Further, as the Queensland Ombudsman has acknowledged, formal modes of 
investigation of administrative complaints “are resource intensive and are not 
always the most effective way of achieving a satisfactory outcome for the 
complainant and the agency.”23
 
In terms of fulfilling the complaint resolution role most university policies give 
university ombuds a wide discretion to deal with matters as they see 
appropriate.24  Assistance to parties in dispute may be in the form of advice, 
counsel, investigation or process provision.25  The university ombud may 
determine that a relatively non-interventionist role such as listening, providing 
and receiving information, referral, reframing issues or developing options is 
                                                 
18   For example, at QUT the University ombudsman is also involved in administrative functions of the University including 
membership of University Committees:  see www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman/about.html.    
19   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182. 
20   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182. 
21   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182.  For an example of issues arising in relation to using the state ombudsman for the resolution of a 
university administrative complaint see:  M Newcity (1984) “Ombudsman Heal Thyself” 9(4) Legal Service Bulletin 175, G 
Masterman, (1985) “A Complaint Against Macquarie University Law School” 10(1) Legal Service Bulletin 17, and M Newcity, (1985) 
“’Ombudsman Heal Thyself’ Revisted” 10(2) Legal Service Bulletin 90. 
22   Fleming (1997) at 142. 
23   Bevan (2002) at 8. 
24   For example, see the QUT Manual of Policies and Procedures section E/9.3. 
25   Rowe (1995) 106-111 and MP Rowe, (1991) “The Ombudsman’s Role in a Dispute Resolution System” 7(4) Negotiation Journal 
353 at 354-356.  
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appropriate.  As Rowe has said, “people who call on an organizational 
ombudsperson typically need options.”26
 
A university ombud may, alternatively, decide that a more active mode of 
assistance such as informal third-party intervention, shuttle diplomacy, or classic 
mediation is suitable.  Generally an ombud should not “investigate formally for 
management for the purpose of adjudication; keep case records for the 
employer; or make management decisions.”27  This is because such actions 
overtly conflict with assertions of independence. 
 
The dispute resolution role of the university ombud “shares many of the features 
of the classical government ombudsman.”28  That is, they are generally the last 
administrative resort29 and operate free from formal university procedures and 
strict rules of evidence.30  It might also be said of both forms of ombud that the 
“role may be one more of influence than authority.”31  Further, both positions 
share a commitment to fairness, accessibility, responsiveness, and to the extent 
that confidentiality allows, openness and accountability.32  
 
Contemporary government ombuds and university ombuds also emphasise 
resolving complaints informally.33 This emphasis correlates with a growing trend 
generally in society for parties in dispute to use alternative dispute resolution 
options.34  In particular, the mediation process is increasingly being used by 
ombuds as a way of providing a structured process to disputants’ discussions.   
 
                                                 
26   Rowe (1995) at 105. 
27   Rowe (1995) at 105. 
28   Stuhmcke (2001) at 182-183. 
29   For example, students at QUT are required to have exhausted all other reasonable steps in finding a resolution before they 
contact the university ombudsman:  www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman/contact.html. 
30   Stuhmke (2001) at 182-183. 
31  P de Jersey, (2002) “Contemporary Decision-Making – Courts and Universities”, Paper presented at the 3rd Australasian 
Conference of Ombuds and Deans of Students in Higher Education, QUT Brisbane, 14 February 2002 at 2 available at 
www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman.html at 7. 
32   Bevan (2002) at 10. 
33   Bevan (2002) at 8. 
34   M Delaney and T Wright, (1997) Plaintiffs’ Satisfaction with Dispute Resolution Processes, Sydney: Law Foundation of New 
South Wales on behalf of the Justice Research Center at 3. 
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Pearce has identified a number of reasons why public ombuds offices are 
considered positive.  These issues apply equally to the office of university 
ombuds and connect directly with the informal nature of the office’s dispute 
resolution practice.  They include: the speed with which matters can be 
processed, accessibility, cost-effectiveness, and the non-threatening nature of 
such processes for the parties.35  Doi has commented that the office succeeds 
because it is committed to the basic principle of arriving at a fair and equitable 
conclusion in each case.36     
 
Whilst the informal dispute resolution processes used by university ombuds have 
many positive characteristics, there are also issues for concern.  The dilemma for 
university ombuds is to achieve procedural and substantive fairness in the 
informal processes they administer.  The next section of this paper examines a 
number of issues that impact on a university ombud’s ability to assist parties to a 
fair and equitable resolution of their case. 
 
Part 2 -  Issues that Impact on the Fair and Equitable Resolution of 
Complaints by University Ombuds. 
 
Informal dispute resolution processes such as those offered by university 
ombuds offer significant advantages of efficiency and cost-saving as compared 
with formal processes.  They are also considered to be more caring and 
focussed on the needs and interests of parties than formal processes.  However, 
these advantages need to be considered along-side a number of criticisms 
including, for example, that informal processes allow disguised forms of coercion 
through failing to provide formal protections.37  For ombuds to be able to assist 
parties in dispute to a resolution that is fair and equitable they need to be aware 
of potential problems in this context.  The issues considered below apply 
                                                 
35   D Pearce, (1993) “The Ombudsman: review and preview the importance of being different” 11 Ombudsman Journal 13-36 at 14. 
36   HS Doi (1974) “Reply” Conference of Australian and Pacific Ombudsmen, Wellington, 19-22 November, Office of Ombudsman, 
8-12 cited in Stuhmcke (2001) at 183.  
37   For a critical discussion of informal justice processes see R Abel (ed) (1982) The Politics of Informal Justice Academic Press: 
New York. 
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analyses of informal processes, which often centre on mediation, to the dispute 
resolution practice of university ombuds. 
 
Voluntary participation 
 
Involvement with the university ombud in relation to a dispute or grievance is 
ostensibly completely voluntary for all parties.  There is no compulsion for 
students to access the office, and no compulsion for academics or other staff to 
engage in the complaints resolution processes administered by the ombud, such 
as mediation.   
 
Voluntary participation is linked in informal processes to party satisfaction and 
compliance with agreed outcomes.  That is, the fact that a person voluntarily 
chooses to participate is considered an indicator of their commitment to that 
process and to reaching an agreed outcome.38  Theoretically, in a voluntary 
process a party (or the third party facilitator39) can withdraw from or terminate the 
process at any time, without giving an explanation or incurring any sort of 
penalty.40  
 
The rhetoric of voluntary participation in relation to an informal process does not, 
however, mean that pressure or coercion will not exist to encourage a party to 
participate.  Boulle comments that there are “gradations of voluntariness”,41 and 
notes that participation is not genuinely voluntary in situations where, for example, 
a party enters under a threat of litigation, or as a result of an inability to afford 
other dispute resolution options, or as a result of a pressuring community such as 
friends, family or people within an organisation.42  In the university context a fear 
                                                 
38  See, for example, R Ingleby (1993) “Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation” 56 Modern Law 
Review 441. 
39  See L Boulle, (1996) Mediation:  Principles, Process, Practice, Butterworths: Sydney at n.28. 
40   Boulle (1996) at 15. 
41   Boulle (1996) at 16.  See also B Wolski (1994) “Voluntariness, Consensuality and Coercion: In Defence of Mandatory Mediation” 
unpublished LLM paper, Bond University where the dimensions of voluntariness are explored. 
42   Boulle (1996) at 16. 
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of more formal university processes might result in significant pressure to 
participate in the informal processes offered by the university ombud. 
 
It cannot therefore be assumed that a student or an academic is participating in a 
truly voluntary way simply because the process is labeled “voluntary”.  Dispute 
resolution conducted in a context of pressured participation may result in a 
potentially inequitable outcome.  That is, the pressure that forces the party’s 
participation may then consequently result in their agreement to an outcome 
which may not be in their interests.   
 
In this regard the fairness and equitable nature of the dispute outcome is clearly 
compromised.  A possible strategy to prevent inequities arising in this context is 
to develop thorough intake processes that raise these issues overtly with each of 
the parties.  Also, private sessions can be used by mediators to openly discuss 
with the parties issues related to any perception of pressured participation. 
 
Party Control and Ombud Power 
 
One of the most attractive principles of the informal processes available to 
complainants through the university ombud is that the parties remain relatively in 
control of their dispute.43  The ombud has no direct decision-making authority 
over the parties, and it is the parties themselves who actively seek to resolve the 
issues in dispute between them.  This principle of active party control over the 
dispute is linked, at least theoretically, to party satisfaction with dispute 
outcomes.44  It is also associated, however, with claims that the ombud’s office is 
a ‘toothless watchdog’ with “no real power, being expected to negotiate 
resolution on the basis of goodwill.”45   
                                                 
43   See generally, J Folger, (1994) The Promise of Mediation – Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, and R Charlton and M Dewdney, (1995) The Mediators Handbook – Skills and Strategies 
for Practitioners, Sydney: LBC Information Services, and H Astor and CM Chinkin (1992) Dispute Resolution in Australia, Sydney: 
Butterworths. 
44   Delaney and Wright (1997) at 4. 
45   Stuhmcke (2001) at 183. 
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This latter claim is not accurate and the party control principle should not allow 
any underestimation of the importance of the university ombud’s role, and the 
potential extent of their real power and authority.  That is, whilst ostensibly 
ombuds have no decision-making authority over the parties, they are not without 
influence and power.   
 
Information and academic experience and expertise are “classic sources” of 
ombud power.46  There are, however, many other sources of real power in terms 
of an ombud’s interaction with parties in dispute.  For example, they are able to 
affirm and commend good academic practice, and as commendations may be 
seen as rewards they provide considerable power.47  Ombuds also “illuminate 
bad behaviour as well as good, raising the concern of sanctions from 
authorities.”48  An ombud’s “moral authority” results from their commitment to 
justice and fairness and is also a source of power.49  Further, an ombud’s 
relationships and connections with authority figures in an organization are said to 
empower him or her.50    
 
These sources of power give an ombud considerable authority in moving the 
parties towards agreement.  Therefore, in terms of ensuring that an equitable and 
fair resolution is reached in every case a university ombud must be mindful of 
how their authority is perceived by the parties, and how the parties are reacting 
to it.  For example, a student impressed by an ombud’s moral authority may defer 
to their opinion or advices in the process even if they do not agree with them.  Or 
an academic may agree to an outcome that they feel the ombud supports on the 
basis that the ombud may then commend them.   
 
                                                 
46   Rowe (1991) at 358. 
47   Rowe (1991) at 357. 
48   Rowe (1991) at 358. 
49   Rowe (1991) at 358. 
50   Rowe (1991) at 358. 
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Further, an ombud must take care to ensure that they do not use their authority 
to steer parties in certain directions to achieve a resolution that satisfies merely 
their own values or biases, and not the interests of the parties.51  
 
Therefore, although the parties are theoretically in control of the process and the 
ultimate outcome to their dispute, the ombud has an ability to strongly influence 
what the likely outcome of the dispute will be.  In order to ensure that the end 
result of the process is fair and equitable an ombud must be aware of the 
potential implications of party perceptions of his or her power. 
 
Neutrality 
 
Related to the issue of university ombud power is the notion of ombud neutrality.  
Neutrality on the part of the third-party intervenor is generally considered central 
to informal justice processes.52  This is perhaps because the concept has a 
“legitimising function” 53  as it replicates a central ideology of more formal 
processes such as litigation, 54  and also because it can be linked to party 
perceptions that justice is “manifestly and undoubtedly being seen to be done.”55   
 
The term neutrality is sometimes used interchangeably with impartiality.56  Boulle 
suggests, however, that a clear distinction needs to be made between these 
terms. 57   “Neutrality” is said to refer to a third-party intervenor’s lack of 
                                                 
51   This has been shown through research to occur in some instances in mediation:  R Dingwall and D Greatbatch (1993) “Who is in 
Charge?  Rhetoric and Evidence in the Study of Mediation” Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 365, D Greatbatch and R 
Dingwall (1989) “Selective Facilitation:  Some Observations on a Strategy Use by Divorce Mediators” 23 Law and Society Review 
613. 
52   Rowe refers to the ombud as a “designated neutral”: Rowe (1995) at 103.  See also Charlton and Dewdney (1995); G Tillet 
(1991) The Myths of Mediation, The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Macquarie University; H Astor (2000) “Rethinking Neutrality: A 
Theory to Inform Practice – Part I”, 11 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 73, and Astor and Chinkin (1992) at 102. 
53   Boulle (1996) at 18-19.  See also Astor (2000) at 74 referring to S Cobb and J Rifkin, (1991) “Neutrality as a Discursive Practice:  
The Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation” 11 Studies in Law and Politics 69 and C Harrington 
and S Engle Merry (1998) “Ideological Production:  The Making of Community Mediation”  22 Law and Society Review 709 . 
54   That is, the concept of neutrality in mediation, for example, is seen as counterbalancing the ideology of judicial neutrality:  Boulle 
(1996) at 18-19. 
55   GA Flick, (1984) Natural Justice: principles, and practical application (2nd ed) Sydney: Butterworths at 155 quoted in Fleming 
(1997) at 146. 
56   The word independence is also used, for example, the QUT university ombud’s materials explain that whilst they “are an 
employee of QUT, [they operate] independently”: www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman/about.html. 
57   Boulle (1996) at 19. 
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knowledge of, and disinterest in, the matter of dispute.  Neutrality focuses on 
issues such as a connection with the parties, any background involvement in the 
issues, or an interest in the substantive outcome.  “Impartiality” is said to relate to 
how the dispute is handled, and how the third-party intervenor treats the parties.  
A lack of bias is central to the concept, as are objectivity, fairness and even-
handedness.58  
  
On the basis of these distinctions it is not possible for ombuds to be neutral 
although it is possible for them to be impartial.59  University ombuds, as human 
agents, will necessarily bring certain personal and professional opinions to the 
dispute resolution process.60  They cannot be neutral because they work for the 
university and are a colleague of one of the parties to the complaint (that is, the 
academic). Most often ombuds are appointed on a fractional basis and so are 
usually teaching and supervising students themselves during the term of their 
appointment.61  They have almost certainly been students themselves at some 
time, and have experiences as a result that will inform their work as ombuds. 
 
A breach of neutrality could therefore occur as a result of the ombud’s own work 
history, experience or collegial connections creating a preconceived idea of the 
case and what would be an appropriate conclusion to it; for example, the ombud 
may have been involved in a similar type dispute when they were a student.  A 
breach of neutrality could also occur if an ombud were to use his or her 
knowledge of the parties to influence the way they help generate settlement 
options or resolution strategies.  On one hand the ombud may be concerned to 
protect their relationship with fellow academics in case of future professional 
interactions on committees, for example.  On the other hand, it does not follow 
that an ombud’s collegial connections will always work in favour of their 
                                                 
58   Boulle (1996) at 19. 
59   As Kurien has said "[t]rue neutrality is impossible to attain because of differing individual cognitive schemata.":  GV. Kurien, 
(1995) "Critique of Myths of Mediation" 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 43 at 52.  Boulle says that whilst a mediator should 
always be impartial, they may not always be neutral: (1996) at 20.  Stuhmcke asserts that an ombud is unable to be independent: 
(2001) at 183.  
60  See G Davis, Partisans and Mediators  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
61   QUT’s appointment is 50% fractional – see Wolff (2000) at 5. 
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academic colleague.  For example, the ombud might consider that the academic 
has been promoted too quickly or may have already had dealings with them on a 
committee with which they did not agree.   
 
In short, it is impossible for university ombuds to be neutral in disputes between 
members of staff and students.  An ombud will want outcomes that will best 
advantage the whole university community, but will be influenced and affected by 
the fact that they themselves are an academic, and have in the past been a 
student.  They will have a deep knowledge of the context of the dispute, and 
probably an on-going professional relationship with one of the parties to the 
dispute.   
  
More generally, also, it is acknowledged that the concept of neutrality in informal 
processes is fraught with difficulty.62  In fact, “some writers refer to neutrality as 
the most pervasive and misleading myth about mediation, arguing that it is 
neither a possible attainment nor a desirable one.”63
 
Nevertheless claims are made that university ombuds are 'third party neutrals' 
who are dispassionate about the disputants, the dispute and the outcome, and 
are non-partisan, and non-judgmental.64  In one sense, this argument is 
supported by the fact that ombuds have no power to make a decision for the 
parties.  The claim is also seen as central to the viability of the office in that the 
rhetoric serves to preserve the appearance of its independence and is said to 
contribute to its effectiveness.65    
 
                                                 
62  Boulle (1996) at 19.  Astor comments that neutrality is “a highly contested term for mediators” and has been “subjected to 
constant analysis, debate and redefinition.” Astor (2000) at 74. 
63   Boulle (1996) at 19.  See also G Tillet (1991) Resolving Conflict – A Practical Approach, Sydney:  Sydney University Press, Tillet 
(1991), Kurien (1995).  And Astor and Chinkin warn that “it is not sufficient simply to claim mediator neutrality (as) mediators have 
considerable power in mediation and there is evidence that they do not always exercise it in a way which is entirely neutral as to 
content and outcome.”:  Astor and Chinkin (1992) at 102.  The research of Greatbatch and Dingwall asserts that mediators are not 
neutral in their mediation practice: Dingwall and Greatbatch (1993), Greatbatch and Dingwall (1989). 
64   Rowe (1995) at 112.  
65   Rowe (1995) at 103. 
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However, a claim of neutrality that is not real has the potential to undermine the 
integrity of an ombud’s process in a number of ways.  First, it can risk an 
ombud’s credibility.  That is, if an ombud is seen not to be honest about their 
interests they may lose the trust of the parties.  Secondly, it can compromise the 
parties’ participation in the process, if that participation is grounded in an 
overestimation of what the ombud can provide in terms of neutrality.  In particular, 
for example, where students are not alert to or conscious of the issues, 
discussed above, that compromise an ombud’s ability to fulfill the promise of 
neutrality.  Thirdly, there is conflict between a claim of neutrality and any effort by 
an ombud to advocate for, or openly work to assist or protect, the weaker party.  
Such intervention is unavoidably non-neutral.66   
 
It is far better, we would suggest, for an ombud to openly contextualise claims of 
neutrality by acknowledging his or her sectional interest.  They are then free to 
more honestly claim and demonstrate an ability to be impartial and fair.67  That is, 
the ombud will be freer to assert that whilst they cannot advocate for either party, 
they will also not allow any power imbalance between the complainant and the 
respondent to determine the outcome.68  The ombud will treat both parties with 
respect and courtesy and will ensure that the implementation of the chosen 
process does not favour one party over another.   
 
The parties will be more likely to perceive an ombud as able to achieve these 
things if he or she openly discusses their perspective and context.69  Further, 
acknowledgment on the part of the ombud of their principled interest in the 
outcome is likely only to advance their standing in the eyes of the parties. 
 
                                                 
66   R Field (2000) “Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality” 3(1) The ADR Bulletin 16. 
67   See the Australian Standard on Complaints Handling under “Fairness”:  AS4260, 1965, para 3.3 
68   On this point it is relevant to consider that informal dispute resolution processes can “behind a mask of neutrality, serve to 
enforce the existing inequalities and produce ‘compromises’ which will invariably favour the more powerful.”: R. Matthews, (1988) 
Informal Justice?, London: Sage Publications at 12.  Ombuds may need to recognise that affirmative interventionist action (but not 
advocacy) on behalf of one of the parties is sometimes needed to achieve a balanced and equitable agreement. 
69  This might even extend, for example, to disclosing, in some instances their personal views on, and responses to, conflict: M. Kirby, 
(1992) "Mediation:  Current Controversies and Future Directions" 3 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 139 at 146. 
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Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality, an essential principle of many informal processes, has been 
referred to as both an ethic and strict practice of ombuds’ business.70  
Confidentiality allows ombud administered processes to operate in an open and 
honest atmosphere, and gives each party the security to disclose information to 
the university ombud, as well as to the other party, that they might otherwise not 
disclose.   
 
Confidentiality in relation to ombuds’ processes generally means two things.  
First, that internal to those processes the ombud commits not to disclose any 
private information to the other party, without their express consent.  And 
secondly, that communications are not generally to be divulged outside the 
process by the ombud or the parties.   
 
Rowe has commented that ombuds “typically will not answer questions from 
anyone, including senior management, about those with whom they may have 
had contact – and they maintain the privacy of everyone with whom they have 
spoken – unless they have permission to speak for the purpose of informal 
problem resolution.”71  If confidentiality is upheld an ombud should not be called 
as a witness in later proceedings, and their notes should not be recovered and 
produced as evidence in subsequent formal processes.  Also neither party 
should disclose or try to rely, in later formal proceedings, on anything said in 
informal processes administered by ombuds.  
 
There are, however, a number of practical problems with the notion of 
confidentiality.72  The first is that it is essentially an ethic of practice that has no 
                                                 
70  Rowe (1995) at 104.  See also QUT’s statement of confidentiality in relation to dealings with the ombud’s office at:   
www.qut.edu.au/ombudsman/about.html.    
71   Rowe asserts that typically ombuds “will not appear in formal proceedings inside or outside their organizations” even where 
parties have given them permission: Rowe (1995) at 104. 
72  Davies and Clarke have acknowledged that "[p]reserving the confidentiality of ADR processes is one of the most difficult legal issues 
facing the ADR movement today":  I. Davies and G. Clarke, (1991) "ADR Procedures in the Family Court of Australia" Queensland Law 
Society Journal 391 at 399. 
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solid foundations or guarantees associated with it, even where it is articulated as 
a formal institutional policy.  The common law doctrine of privilege may work to 
protect the confidentiality of ombuds’ proceedings,73 however, this protection is 
by no means certain.74   
 
Secondly, there is the potential for abuse of the principle.  That is, confidentiality 
provides a party with no real protection from a failure on the part of another party 
to disclose information, no protection from their disclosure of false information, 
and no protection from a party using the process as an information 'fishing 
expedition'.   
 
Thirdly, there may be times when confidentiality will, in practice, need to be 
broken.75  For example, Stone considers in relation to mediation, that if an 
agreement is induced by fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of a party the 
courts may intervene, and the fundamental principle of confidentiality will be 
outweighed by the need for judicial intervention.76  
 
The answer to these dilemmas lies in the fact that strict guarantees of 
confidentiality can only be provided by statute.77  Therefore, unless a university’s 
Act has been amended to ensure confidentiality in the practice of the university 
ombud, assertions of confidentiality are based on goodwill and institutional policy 
rather than on any solid legal foundation.  These assertions may carry little 
weight if the dispute proceeds to a more formal forum, such as a court, where 
parties are bound, for example, by orders to produce documents or to appear as 
                                                 
73   See the Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence (Vol. 2) Interim Report No.26, AGPS, 1985 at Appendix C:  "Differences 
and Uncertainties in the Law of Evidence".  See also the High Court of Australia decision of Rodgers v. Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 
608 at 614 for the application of this doctrine in the matrimonial context.  See also, Boulle (1996) at 281-293. 
74   See Boulle (1996) at 282 – 290.  Rowe states that ombuds “maintain that there is (or should be) a privilege which belongs to the 
office.”:  Rowe (1995) at 104.   
75   M Stone (1998) Representing Clients in Mediation – A New Professional Skill, London: Butterworths at 21-22. 
76  Stone (1998) at 21. 
77  For example, the Family Law Act provides in s.19N that evidence of anything said or any admission made in a mediation is not 
admissible in any court.  S.5.3(4) of the Dispute Resolution Centres Act, 1990 (Qld) makes similar provision, and s.5.3(2) extends a 
defamation-like privilege to a mediation session; in addition s.5.4 requires that mediators take an oath of secrecy. 
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a witness. It is preferable, therefore, for any assurance to parties of confidentiality 
to have its foundation in a legislative source.   
 
Another possible option is to protect confidentiality expressly by contract.  For 
example, through Agreements to Mediate that specifically include a clause that 
“binds the parties and the mediator not to disclose to persons outside the 
mediation any information or document used in the mediation.”78  Also possible is 
a contractual provision between the ombud and the university in which the 
university agrees that they will not call the ombud in their own defence.79  
However as Boulle notes, these sorts of provisions “have not yet been 
considered by Australian courts.”80  
 
Until such practices can ensure the confidential nature of informal processes 
administered by ombuds, parties should be made aware of these issues before 
they choose to participate.  Also, parties should be encouraged to use any 
private sessions with the ombud to discuss their fears or concerns on this issue; 
for example, that they are anxious to speak frankly for fear of any possible later 
misuse of information divulged.  These practices are central to achieving a fair 
and equitable outcome for the parties.  
 
Skill Issues for Ombuds 
 
In ombuds administered informal processes the parties are heavily reliant on the 
dispute resolution skills of the ombud for the successful resolution of the complaint.  
Skills issues relate specifically to an ombud’s appropriate use of sources of power 
and authority in relation to the parties, to an ability to "adapt the process to suit the 
individual needs of the parties in conflict,"81 and to the provision of fair and equitable 
process to the parties for the resolution of their dispute.  It is also a crucial skill of an 
                                                 
78   Boulle (1996) at 289. 
79  Rowe (1995) at 104. 
80   Boulle (1996) at 289. 
81  Kurien (1995) at 50. 
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ombud that they are able to communicate effectively to the parties what outcomes 
are possible through various process options and what each particular process 
involves. 
 
Currently, it seems problematic for the equitable and fair resolution of complaints 
that an ombud’s key skill and training requirements remain ill-defined.  Rowe has 
noted some specific skills that ombuds require, such as those relating to 
“maintaining confidentiality and neutrality, maintaining statistical records and using 
them appropriately, and using data – in a fashion consonant with confidentiality.”82  
Other skills seem to be relatively vague, however.  For example, Rowe states that 
an ombud should “show common sense, and continually strive for good judgment, 
respect, and compassion.”83  Further, an ombud “should learn how to use 
inoffensive humour to defuse stress and tension,”84 and an ombud “should 
continually try to learn more about preventing and dealing with reprisal, and how to 
help people who fear reprisal.”85
 
It seems crucial to the development of sound ombud practice that the skills required 
in the office are better identified and articulated.  It follows from this that these skills 
need then to be taught, assessed and monitored. 
  
Whilst an ombud can acquire some of the necessary skills of their practice through 
experience, reading, self-reflection, workshops at professional conferences, and 
discussions with other ombuds, it is formal training, particularly in dispute resolution 
and communication skills, as well as in issues such as those addressed in this article, 
that needs to be emphasized to ensure adequate skill levels in ombuds.  Formal 
skills are particularly necessary for an ombud to practice mediation effectively.   
 
                                                 
82   Rowe (1995) at 111. 
83   Rowe (1995) at 111. 
84   Rowe (1995) at 111. 
85   Rowe (1995) at 112. 
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To be effective, this training should take a formal and structured form as it is 
insufficient to rely on the instinctive qualities of those appointed to the office, or to 
hope that through study or self-reflection alone they will develop the necessary skills.  
However, an important complement to formal training should be acknowledged in 
the form of collegial interaction.86   
 
Instigating a national system of university ombud training would ensure quality of 
practice and competency levels, and this in turn would contribute to more equitable 
and fair practice in dispute resolution processes administered by ombuds.  Formal 
ombud training programs would also provide a forum for collegial interaction and 
networking which would complement the current annual conference that is held for 
Australian university ombuds. 
 
Issues Related to Data Collection 
 
Although the office of ombud “has been criticised for a lack of accountability”,87 
university ombuds are usually required to collect data in relation to the cases they 
handle.   A good database is considered “vital for trend analysis and for strategies 
for reducing complaints of particular kinds, managing workloads and the progress of 
individual complaints, and producing statistical reports of performance.”88  Whilst 
these statistics are interesting and important at one level, the maintenance of such 
databases can give rise to a number of issues of concern.   
 
First, for example, such complaints handling indicators “generally measure basic 
information such as number of complaints and timeframes but not the value of the 
service delivered.”89  Secondly, the keeping of such records in informal processes 
can place a high value on settlement rates that results in a concentration on the 
parties simply reaching some form of agreement instead of on the quality of that 
                                                 
86  De Jersey (2002) at 9-10. 
87   Stuhmcke (2001) at 183. 
88   Bevan (2002) at 9. 
89   Bevan (2002) at 9. 
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agreement.90  Settlement statistics can then be used as indicators and evidence of 
an ombud’s ability to 'produce results'.91  The ombud's desire to see a resolution 
may therefore encourage them to take a more interventionist role, which may be 
potentially contrary to the interests of the parties, especially if it is driven by the 
ombud’s own opinions, experiences or values.   
 
Therefore, it is possible that situations where parties have in fact succumbed to 
coerced capitulation (perhaps from a desire to end the dispute, or to escape the 
pressures of the dispute or the process) are reframed as 'successful resolution' and 
statistically analysed as 'agreement'.92  These statistics are clearly not accurate and 
do not reflect an equitable or fair process or outcome.  Rather they reflect a 
distortion of the process and a misrepresentation of what ombuds are able, in reality, 
to achieve.  This is a serious matter in informal proceedings where the veracity of 
the representation cannot be tested as a result of confidentiality and privacy issues.    
 
The dangers of a university focusing on settlement data must therefore be 
acknowledged in terms of the potential impact on the equitable and fair outcome of 
cases, and the hazards of an ombud's possible preoccupation with settlement rates 
must also be acknowledged and addressed.  
 
Privacy 
 
One of the key benefits of informal processes is that they protect parties from public 
scrutiny of their dispute.  The emotive and difficult content of most academic 
disputes, exacerbated by issues of reputation or wanting to protect future career 
prospects, heightens the desire of participants to keep the issues out of the public 
                                                 
90 R Ingleby, (1990a) “Catholics, Communists, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Bob Dylan” 1 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 18 
at 20.  See also, DG Pruitt, RS Peirce, NB McGillicuddy, GL Welton and LM Castrianno (1993)  "Long-Term Success in Mediation" 17(3) 
Law and Human Behaviour 313.     
91  R. Ingelby (1990b) "Why Not Toss a Coin?  Issues of Quality and Efficiency in the Evaluation of Alternative Dispute Resolution" Papers 
Presented at the 9th Annual AIJA Conference, 18-19 August, Melbourne, 51 at 55 says this in relation to mediation in general. 
92  Ingleby (1990a) at 20 questions the reframing of mediated outcomes in this way. 
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arena.  And there are many other asserted benefits of what is known as private 
ordering.93    
 
However, problems can arise for parties where academic disputes are resolved 
away from the public interest yardsticks developed by more formal processes, or by 
the courts.  Formal processes, in focussing not on maximizing the ends of private 
parties but on identifying and giving force to objective values,94 are said by some to 
offer a “proper resolution” to a dispute.95  
 
Formal processes also offer the weaker party, in this instance usually the student, 
certain protections.  Without these protections, such as the ability to test the 
assertions and credibility of the other party, their vulnerability is exacerbated.  This is 
a key reason why ombuds need to be aware of the issues discussed above, and 
trained in appropriate ways to deal with the disadvantages associated with informal 
dispute resolution processes.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The issues addressed in this article raise some significant difficulties in terms of 
ensuring that fair and equitable results ensue from complaints procedures 
administered by university ombuds.  Many of these difficulties could be 
addressed, and their negative impact limited, if there were a greater focus on 
training for university ombuds.  That is, university ombuds will be in a better 
position to ensure fair and equitable results in their processes with a more 
sophisticated understanding of these issues, and that understanding can only be 
developed through structured training programs.  The development of a national 
training program for university ombuds should therefore be a priority within the 
profession.   
                                                 
93  See, for example, RH. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, (1979) "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case of Divorce" 88 Yale Law 
Journal 950 at 974. 
94  See OM Fiss (1984) "Against Settlement" 93 Yale Law Journal 1073 at 1085.  
95  HT Edwards (1986) "Commentary - Alternative Dispute Resolution:  Panacea or Anathema?" 99 Harvard Law Review 668 at 676. 
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